SPEAKER_01: 0:18

Okay, let's unpack this. We are diving deep into what is well arguably the most staggering financial and legal reversal of the decade. Tom Hayes, you know, the former UBS trader who basically became the global poster child for the LIBOR scandal. He's now suing his former employer. And not for a small amount. We're talking not less than$400 million.

SPEAKER_00: 0:38

Aaron Ross Powell Yeah, and it's uh it's not just about seeking damages, is it? It's really like a forensic case study of well, institutional betrayal. We've been uh pouring over the source material, primarily the detailed court complaint, Hayes v. UBS, and you know, related news filings. And what emerges is just this microscopic view of how a global bank could create a systemic practice, profit massively from it. Right. And then when the regulators came knocking, aggressively sacrifice one, frankly, vulnerable individual to protect its senior leadership and well, its entire franchise.

SPEAKER_01: 1:09

So our mission today is to trace this incredible trajectory. I mean, how did Hayes, convicted, imprisoned in the UK, as the evil mastermind? How did he manage to get his name completely cleared? By the highest courts, no less, in both the UK and the U.S. And uh why does he now claim that the very conduct he was prosecuted for was not just known, but explicitly directed by senior UBS management? This complaint, it's just it's a devastating counter narrative to the one the public, you know, consumed for over a decade.

SPEAKER_00: 1:40

Aaron Ross Powell It really is. And what's fascinating here is that the sources they lay out this compelling document-backed challenge to that official narrative. A challenge that uh exposes the cavernous gap between UBS's internal written policy for setting benchmark rates and the, let's be frank, self-serving narrative the bank later presented to global authorities, all to save itself from potential financial ruin.

SPEAKER_01: 2:01

Aaron Powell Okay, so section one then, setting the stage, the player in the game. Before we get into the whole corporate scapegoating thing, we really have to establish the playing field. For those of you who might be newer to this topic, what exactly was LIBOR and why was trying to influence it such a massive deal?

SPEAKER_00: 2:14

Aaron Ross Powell Right, LIBOR. It stands for the London Inner Bank Offered Rate. Um to simplify its role, it was the world's most crucial benchmark interest rate, essentially. It was based on an estimate what the panel banks, the big banks, believed they would pay to borrow short-term funds from each other. Now, crucially, this seemingly simple estimate was the reference point for contracts valued in the trillions, trillions of dollars globally. Trillions. Yeah, we're talking everything from really complex financial derivatives to you know everyday things like mortgages and student loans.

SPEAKER_01: 2:47

Wow, trillions. So the integrity of that rate was absolutely paramount because its movement, even by tiny fractions like basis points, it had monumental implications everywhere. Trevor Burrus, Jr.

SPEAKER_00: 2:58

Exactly right. The integrity was built entirely on trust, the idea that banks were submitting uh honest estimates of their true borrowing costs. And while LIBOR itself was officially phased out as a standard benchmark in mid-2023, the consequences of its manipulation back in the 2000s, they're still echoing in the courts today, loudly.

SPEAKER_01: 3:15

Okay, now let's look at the central figure in this lawsuit, Tom Hayes. He was, by all accounts, an exceptionally high-achieving young trader, hired by UBS specifically for his genius in mathematics and financial modeling, specifically for the Yen derivatives desk in Tokyo. And he was young, barely 26 when he joined in 2006.

SPEAKER_00: 3:34

Yeah, and Hayes' profile is absolutely fundamental to the story of why he became, in UBS's eyes, the perfect fall guy. The complaint openly discusses his diagnosis with autism spectrum disorder, ASD. His cognitive profile, you know, characterized by this highly linear, sometimes one-track thinking, and a deep reliance on explicit instruction, on rule following. It made him an incredibly effective trader, especially in a rules-based environment. Oh, it's ironically. But ironically, it also made him vulnerable, uh, easy to isolate when the bank decided it needed a villain.

SPEAKER_01: 4:06

And the sources detail this truly disturbing exclusionary workplace culture he faced, which just reinforces how easily he was later isolated. This wasn't just like standard high-pressure trading floor stuff. The complaint notes colleagues routinely use derogatory nicknames, things like Rainman and Kid Asperger's.

SPEAKER_00: 4:23

That kind of language, it reflects a deeply exclusionary and frankly toxic culture. You have to wonder, right, would they have tried to scapegoat him so easily if he'd been, say, a smooth-talking, socially adept manager type? Probably not. His difference, his focus on explicit rules and structure, the very thing that made him$300 million for the bank, was later weaponized against him. Used to portray him as this socially awkward lone wolf who couldn't possibly be operating under corporate direction.

SPEAKER_01: 4:51

Okay, so this brings us neatly to the core claim of the lawsuit. The direct refutation of that lone wolf narrative. The complaint states explicitly that the conduct Hayes was later imprisoned for wasn't rogue behavior at all. It was institutional policy.

SPEAKER_00: 5:05

That's the absolute pivot point here. The lawsuit states very clearly that UBS policy explicitly required LIBOR submitters, the rates traders, the CERT traders, to consider the bank's commercial interests, specifically its trading positions when setting these estimated rates. And this policy wasn't hidden. It was known, established, and formally approved by senior managers, including Sasha Prince, the global co-head of rates.

SPEAKER_01: 5:27

So wait, this wasn't just some kind of nudge-nudge wink-wink thing. It was an established, possibly even written mandate. The bank was effectively saying you must look at what benefits us financially when you make this submission.

SPEAKER_00: 5:40

That's precisely the allegation. Which means the conduct he was later prosecuted for was, at the time he was doing it, entirely consistent with how UBS wanted its traders to operate. It wasn't rogue, it was the job.

SPEAKER_01: 5:52

Wow. And how did they operationalize that? You mentioned tools.

SPEAKER_00: 5:55

Yes. I can trace this institutionalization right down to the internal tools they used. UBS maintained these highly detailed daily internal spreadsheets. Think of them almost like a central control panel for the really critical currencies: Euro LIBOR, USD LIBOR, GBP LIBOR. These internal documents, which the complaint says were concealed from authorities for years, tracked the bank's aggregated exposure across all these different currencies.

SPEAKER_01: 6:19

And these weren't just for reporting, like profit and loss statements.

SPEAKER_00: 6:22

No, no, no. Far from it. These spreadsheets were actively used to instruct the rates traders on how to influence the submissions. The goal maximize UBS's profit.

SPEAKER_01: 6:31

Can you give us a sense of how specific those instructions were?

SPEAKER_00: 6:33

Absolutely. The updated internal LIBOR policy, and this is key, it was in place before Hayes even joined the firm, contained explicit illustrative instructions, examples of how to influence fixings. The source material highlights one specific example. They track something called the negative delta. So if the Euro LIBOR calculation for a specific term, let's say three months, showed the bank was receiving a negative delta, meaning the current rate fixing would cause a loss for the bank because of its net positions.

SPEAKER_01: 7:03

Okay.

SPEAKER_00: 7:04

The policy explicitly detailed the required response, what the trader should do. Which was. They were instructed to increase the fixing by 25 basis points to ensure a positive outcome and increase profit. Now think about that for a second. 25 basis points a quarter of 1% multiplied across trillions of dollars in contracts. That's a colossal movement of money. And it was seemingly written into an internal policy document. It shows senior management wasn't just like vaguely aware of the practice, they had quantified the desired outcome.

SPEAKER_01: 7:35

Aaron Powell So UBS senior management, particularly in London, was deeply entrenched in this systemic practice across its major trading desks.

SPEAKER_00: 7:44

Aaron Powell That's the picture the complaint paints, yes. Deeply entrenched. Hashtag 1.3, Hayes' work in management direction.

SPEAKER_01: 7:51

Aaron Ross Powell Okay, now let's narrow the focus back to Hayes himself. In Tokyo, starting in 2006 on the Yen derivatives desk, you mentioned the yen market was distinct.

SPEAKER_00: 7:59

Aaron Powell Yeah, it was less mature, uh less formalized than the big euro or dollar markets. And the yen LIBOR submissions were primarily handled by one senior STR trader back in London, a guy named Roger Darren.

SPEAKER_01: 8:11

Aaron Ross Powell And this is where the paper trail, the evidence showing direct management approval, becomes really crucial for the lawsuit, right?

SPEAKER_00: 8:17

Aaron Powell Undeniable, according to the complaint. Hayes, consistent with his ASD profile, you know, needing explicit direction, didn't communicate his request to influence the Unlight War secretly. He did it routinely. These communications went directly to a supervisor, Mike Peary, often daily, often in writing, asking for help to influence the rates to benefit his desk's positions.

SPEAKER_01: 8:37

And the complaint alleges Peary didn't just passively receive this information, he actively directed Hayes' actions and put pressure on the submitters.

SPEAKER_00: 8:46

Exactly. He exerted pressure to benefit the Yen desk specifically, which again removes any claim that Hayes was somehow operating independently or outside the corporate structure. It was managed. Yes, Christmas Day. A senior trader on the Yen Desk, someone named Nayomichi, sent an email directing Hayes to ensure lower LIBOR submissions for a specific rate. And crucially, that email was copied directly to Pierre, Hayes' supervisor.

SPEAKER_01: 9:22

On Christmas Day?

SPEAKER_00: 9:23

On Christmas Day. That's an explicit instruction to manipulate the benchmark for the bank's profit received and acknowledged by Hayes' manager on a major holiday. It shows the urgency and, well, the accepted nature of the practice.

SPEAKER_01: 9:34

Aaron Powell Okay, let's talk about the money. Because that often feels like the ultimate proof of corporate approval, doesn't it? Over three years, Hayes generated approximately$300 million in profit for UBS. That kind of performance. It doesn't go unnoticed.

SPEAKER_00: 9:49

Aaron Powell Far from it. And when Hayes started attracting offers from rivals, specifically Goldman Sachs, who apparently offered him a staggering$5 million upfront bonus senior management at UBS went into damage control, they needed him to stay. And their internal justification for retaining him is pure gold for this lawsuit.

SPEAKER_01: 10:08

Aaron Powell They offered him a massive retention bonus themselves, right?$2.5 million.

SPEAKER_00: 10:13

Well, they only ended up paying him$250,000 of it before the scandal broke, which is, you know, a significant piece of financial betrayal in its own right. But the internal communication about why they needed him, that's the real evidence here.

SPEAKER_01: 10:25

What did it say? Aaron Ross Powell, Jr.

SPEAKER_00: 10:26

The internal email from Pierre, his supervisor, to Yvonne Der Crow, who was a global co-head of rates trading. This is pretty damning. Pierre explicitly listed Hayes' strong connections to LIBOR setters in London as information that was invaluable for the derivatives books and strategic for the firm.

SPEAKER_01: 10:42

Wow. Invaluable.

SPEAKER_00: 10:44

Invaluable. That's direct, written proof that management was aware of the mechanism, the connections he used to influence submissions, and they explicitly valued and rewarded that mechanism. They were effectively rewarding the very conduct they later told the DOJ and SFO was criminal and rogue.

SPEAKER_01: 11:00

So management wasn't just passively aware of his high profit margins. They understood how he achieved them, deemed it invaluable, and put a multi-million dollar price tag on keeping that mechanism inside UBS.

SPEAKER_00: 11:11

Aaron Powell That's precisely the argument. They knew, they valued it, they paid for it, or at least they offered to pay for it.

SPEAKER_01: 11:17

Okay, so we've established that up to say 2008, UBS was fully aware, implicitly approving, and handsomely profiting from these systemic practices. Practices codifying their own internal rules, potentially, that the 2008 financial crisis hits. And the music stops. This marks the beginning of the great corporate pivot, doesn't it?

SPEAKER_00: 11:36

Aaron Powell Oh, absolutely. The world changed overnight. After the crisis, the global regulatory environment became incredibly aggressive, hardened significantly. Authorities, especially the U.S. Department of Justice, the DOJ, and the UK's serious fraud office, the SFO, launched these massive multi-year investigations into widespread LIBOR manipulation across the industry. Suddenly, UBS faced existential ruin, potentially including the loss of its crucial US dollar clearing license, which, you know, would cripple its global operations.

SPEAKER_01: 12:48

So cooperation wasn't really optional anymore. It was survival. But cooperation meant taking responsibility, and UBS wasn't willing to let its senior management or maybe its entire franchise take the fall for what was essentially historical corporate practice.

SPEAKER_00: 13:02

Aaron Powell That seems to be the core of the argument, yes. They pivoted abruptly, from defending their policy or at least tolerating it to condemning it, and more importantly, finding a palatable, high-profile villain, someone to offer up.

SPEAKER_01: 13:14

And how did they choose that villain?

SPEAKER_00: 13:15

Well, the sources indicate UBS needed a very specific type of figure. Someone non-management, ideally distant from the Zurich headquarters, and uh crucially, someone who no longer worked for the bank. Tom Hayes, with his distinct profile, his distance in Tokyo, and his recent resignation, he fit the bill perfectly. He was the ideal, politically expendable figure, the perfect fall guy.

SPEAKER_01: 13:39

And the lawsuit alleges that the internal investigation they conducted, the one led by outside counsel Gibson Dunn, it wasn't a genuine search for truth.

SPEAKER_00: 13:47

The claim is it was what we might call investigation theater. The goal was predefined. Justify Hayes' eventual prosecution and pin all the significant issues exclusively on him. And this is where the systematic deception allegedly began. UBS had to conceal the truth about their bank wide policy, the one that factored commercial interests into submissions.

SPEAKER_01: 14:07

Aaron Powell What specific information did they allegedly withhold, things that would have helped Hayes?

SPEAKER_00: 14:11

According to the complaint, the most critical documents were those LIBOR spreadsheets we talked about earlier. Those documents proved systematic manipulation across USD, Euro, and GBP fixings, showing the issue wasn't just confined to Hayes' relatively small yen desk in Tokyo. It was much bigger. The complaint says UBS hid these documents. They also selectively disclosed information, ensuring the regulatory spotlight was diverted away from senior executives who had approved the underlying policies, people like Karsten Kenghetter, Sasha Prince, Yvonne Ducrow.

SPEAKER_01: 14:45

So the narrative they presented to prosecutors was effectively a fabrication. Hayes is the evil mastermind.

SPEAKER_00: 14:50

The evil mastermind, the lone wolf, acting improperly and independently. That was the story. Despite their own internal evidence apparently showing his actions were directed by his manager, Pierre, and were consistent with established UBS practice at the time.

SPEAKER_01: 15:03

And the sources quote that phrase, evil mastermind.

SPEAKER_00: 15:06

They do. The bank's internal description, allegedly used when dealing with authorities, it was instrumental. By setting Hayes up as the singular villain, UBS successfully minimized the roles of their senior leadership and created the necessary conditions to essentially facilitate his prosecution in both the US and the UK, all to secure their own leniency. Hashtag tag hashtag 2.3, the non-prosecution agreement, NPA.

SPEAKER_01: 15:31

And this whole strategy, it culminates in December 2012, right? UBS enters into this sweeping non-prosecution agreement with the DOJ. Meanwhile, UBS Japan pleads guilty to wire fraud in Connecticut. This was the massive quid pro quo, wasn't it? Leniency and protection for the parent company, UBS AG, and its senior management in exchange for cooperation.

SPEAKER_00: 15:51

Exactly. And the key document underpinning that deal is the statement of facts. It was Exhibit 8 to the agreement. This document became the official sanitized history of the scandal, at least as UBS presented it. And the complaint argues it drastically misrepresented the scope of the misconduct, presented it as merely occasional and episodic acts confined mostly to that less formalized yen market in Japan.

SPEAKER_01: 16:12

Aaron Powell So portraying the systemic issue as just isolated bad behavior by a few traders like Hayes.

SPEAKER_00: 16:18

Aaron Powell Pretty much. Despite, again, allegedly having internal documents proving systemic manipulation across all major currencies, originating from London and elsewhere.

SPEAKER_01: 16:28

Aaron Powell And that false official narrative, it was carefully designed to protect the people at the very top, wasn't it?

SPEAKER_00: 16:33

No, absolutely. The statement of facts, according to the analysis and the source material, was meticulously crafted to shield the highest levels of the bank. While it might have mentioned senior manager awareness in certain footnotes, it included crucial but subtle legal language. It explicitly defined those generalized terms like manager and senior manager as not including members of the executive board or the board of directors. Pure sleight of hand, arguably. Designed to minimize the scope of the conspiracy, ensure accountability stopped far below the C-suite.

SPEAKER_01: 17:05

And the timing of this whole maneuver is just critical. The announcement of the NPA, the deal that protected the bank and its leadership, coincided precisely with Tom Hayes' arrest in the UK on December 11, 2012. He was the criminal scalp authorities needed to justify the massive deal they struck with UBS.

SPEAKER_00: 17:22

The timing certainly confirms the connection, doesn't it? The bank provided the authorities with their villain. This ensured the narrative focused on individual criminality, not institutional failure, which secured their corporate freedom, albeit at the cost of huge fines.

SPEAKER_01: 17:37

Okay, so the bank is protected, the narrative is set, and Tom Hayes is now facing simultaneous prosecution in two major jurisdictions. What evidence did UBS continue to withhold even after the NPA? How did that prejudice his defense?

SPEAKER_00: 17:50

Well, the lawsuit claims that even after securing the MPA, UBS continued its strategy of obfuscation, of hiding key evidence. They failed to disclose crucial, potentially exculpatory evidence, like those bank wide LIBOR spreadsheets we keep mentioning. They demonstrated systematic manipulation across all currencies, not just yen. They also allegedly failed to provide comprehensive PL statements, profit and loss. These would have shown Hayes' limited personal gain compared to the bank's massive profits from the overall activity. Withholding that kind of information severely crippled Hayes' ability to defend himself by proving he was just acting under bank policy.

SPEAKER_01: 18:27

And this leads us to the critical error in the UK trial in 2015, the trial where Hayes was convicted. It all hinged on a specific instruction given to the jury by the judge, Justice Cook.

SPEAKER_00: 18:38

Yes, this is absolutely the crux of the judicial error, the error that destroyed Hayes' life for years, but also ultimately led to his vindication. Justice Cook improperly instructed the jury, according to the later Supreme Court ruling. He told them that considering a bank's commercial interests, meaning factoring in their trading positions when submitting a LIBOR estimate was necessarily wrongful, that it automatically constituted a conspiracy to defraud.

SPEAKER_01: 19:03

But wait, Hayes' entire defense was that his conduct was exactly that, consistent with a UBS policy, consistent with long-standing industry practice, taught and condoned by senior management.

SPEAKER_00: 19:16

Precisely.

SPEAKER_01: 19:16

So by making commercial interest inherently criminal, the judge essentially just removed Hayes' entire defense from the jury's consideration.

SPEAKER_00: 19:23

That's effectively what happened. Yes. The judge's instruction essentially told the jury ignore the systemic context, ignore the bank policy arguments, focus solely on the fact that Hayes intended to influence the rate to benefit the bank's positions. By defining that intent alone as criminal, it pretty much prejudged the case, made conviction almost inevitable. Hashtag 3.2. The ruin of a life.

SPEAKER_01: 19:45

And the consequences of this wrongful conviction were just absolute devastation for him, weren't they? Hayes served over five years in prison, including time in high security facilities, sharing cells with violent offenders, suffering multiple assaults.

SPEAKER_00: 19:59

Yeah, the detail in the complaint about the ruin of his life is genuinely difficult to read. It's harrowing. He didn't just lose his liberty, he lost his entire standing in the world. He was permanently branded by major media outlets as the global face of financial crime. Because of all the negative press and the charges, he was debanked, kicked out by major financial institutions like JP Morgan Chase, couldn't even have a bank account. His assets were frozen. He was forced to sell his family home simply to cover his defense costs, which, as the complaint states, exceeded$1 million.

SPEAKER_01: 20:32

And beyond the financial ruin, there's the physical and emotional toll, this institutional betrayal. The sources note the extreme stress of this wrongful prosecution caused severe mental, emotional, and physical trauma, including tragically, the manifestation of multiple sclerosis, MS, during his UK trial.

SPEAKER_00: 20:49

It's devastating. And think about the lost potential. He was on a career trajectory back in 2010 that likely would have seen him earning, you know, five to ten million dollars a year for decades. Given the path of high-level Wall Street pay, instead, he lost hundreds of millions in potential lifetime earnings. And beyond that, the immense strain fractured his personal life. He and his wife separated in 2019, divorced in 2022. The consequences were just total. Hashtags tag tags tag 3.3, exoneration and legal precedent.

SPEAKER_01: 21:16

But the long road towards vindication finally started to yield results years later. It began really in January 2022. The U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of another banker, Matthew Connolly, and that set a crucial legal precedent.

SPEAKER_00: 21:30

That precedent was huge. It fundamentally undermined the prosecution's core argument in these LIBOR cases. The Second Circuit found no reasonable dosis to believe that merely considering treating positions and LIBOR submissions constituted illegal wire fraud, assuming the rate submitted was still within a range of plausible borrowing costs. This was the first major judicial blow against that simplistic commercial interest is automatically criminal argument that had underpinned Hayes' conviction.

SPEAKER_01: 22:00

And following that precedent, the USDOJ was basically forced to act.

SPEAKER_00: 22:04

They were. They formally dismissed the criminal case against Hayes in October 2022, acknowledging that there was simply no basis to continue the prosecution in light of the Second Circuit's ruling on Connolly, one down. Trevor Burrus, Jr.

SPEAKER_01: 22:15

But the really complete legal clearance came much more recently, July 2025. The UK Supreme Court quashed Hayes' conviction entirely. They confirmed that Justice Cook, the trial judge, had fundamentally misunderstood and misstated the law. His instruction to the jury was wrong.

SPEAKER_00: 22:31

Yes, comprehensively wrong.

SPEAKER_01: 22:33

Can you elaborate just a bit more on the precise legal distinction the Supreme Court made? Because this feels like the absolute key to the whole thing.

SPEAKER_00: 22:41

It really is. The Supreme Court ruling validated Hayes' core defense, the one he tried to make back in 2015. It established that while a bank could not submit a rate that was completely divorced from reality, pure fiction, it could legitimately submit a rate that fell within an acceptable range of its estimated borrowing costs. And this is crucial, even if the bank chose a rate within that legitimate range, specifically because it maximized its commercial interests and profits. The key was the existence of a genuine range of acceptable, non-manipulated potential costs.

SPEAKER_01: 23:15

So Justice Cook's instruction was wrong because it eliminated that legitimate range entirely.

SPEAKER_00: 23:20

Exactly. By deeming any consideration of commercial interest as automatically criminal, it completely whiled out the possibility of operating legitimately within that range. It made conviction inevitable if any commercial thought was present.

SPEAKER_01: 23:32

Aaron Powell So, in effect, the UK Supreme Court declared that the very act Hayes was imprisoned for operating within what he argued was an institutional mandate to choose a profitable rate within a genuine range was not, in fact, criminal under English law.

SPEAKER_00: 23:47

Correct. And significantly, the UK authorities acknowledged they would not seek a retrial, finally closing the criminal chapter after 13 long years of legal battles. Vindication.

SPEAKER_01: 23:57

So after complete exoneration in both the U.S. and the UK, we arrive at the present moment. The filing of this lawsuit in October 2025, Hayes is now seeking financial redress from UBS for what he powerfully describes in the complaint as their shameful, wrong, and morally unconscionable actions.

SPEAKER_00: 24:15

Yes, and the complaint centers on two very specific legal counts. Count one is the really powerful claim of malicious prosecution. Hayes alleges that UBS didn't just cooperate passively with authorities. They actively initiated and perpetuated the criminal proceedings against him. How? By intentionally providing false and misleading information to prosecutors.

SPEAKER_01: 24:34

And the motive, according to lawsuit, was purely self-preservation for UBS.

SPEAKER_00: 24:38

Entirely, the suit alleges. UBS's intent was to limit its own massive potential civil, criminal, and regulatory liability, and critically, to protect its senior management, the ones who had arguably approved the systemic practices in the first place.

SPEAKER_01: 24:53

Aaron Powell So the lawsuit argues UBS knew it had no probable cause, no real basis to believe Hayes would be successfully prosecuted for actual crimes based on their own internal documents.

SPEAKER_00: 25:04

Aaron Powell That's the core of the malicious prosecution claim. That UBS knew their internal documents proved his actions were policy compliant or at least directed by management. So by fabricating the lone wolf story, by withholding the crucial spreadsheets and management emails showing approval, they actively maliciously created the conditions for his prosecution.

SPEAKER_01: 25:23

Okay, and count too. That's the claim for indemnification.

SPEAKER_00: 25:27

Yes, this is rooted in basic agency law. Hayes argues that he acted as an agent for UBS. His LIBOR-related conduct, which remember, generated$300 million in profit for the bank, was clearly within the scope of his employment, and it was undertaken entirely for the purpose of benefiting UBS.

SPEAKER_01: 25:42

So, because the bank benefited directly and explicitly approved his actions at the managerial level.

SPEAKER_00: 25:49

Hayes claims UBS is legally obligated to reimburse him, to indemnify him for the substantial legal expenses he incurred, defending himself against the consequences of actions that were effectively bank policy. He's seeking repayment for that$1 million plus defense cost he had to bear personally.

SPEAKER_01: 26:04

Right. Let's talk about the damages sought. They are truly staggering, not less than$400 million, plus exemplary damages and legal costs. How does Hayes's claim even arrive at such a monumental figure?

SPEAKER_00: 26:16

Well, the$400 million figure, it's a calculation based primarily on lost potential lifetime earnings. But it also clearly aims to encompass the severe trauma and suffering inflicted over more than a decade. As we discussed, a trader of his caliber, especially in that derivatives market, particularly after the 2010 financial surge, he was realistically on track to potentially earn conservatively over$200 million across several decades, maybe much more. But the lawsuit isn't just seeking compensation for lost income, it's for the complete destruction of his professional future, coupled with the profound emotional and physical injury, including the MS diagnosis allegedly caused by the prosecution orchestrated by his former employer.

SPEAKER_01: 26:57

It's just it's a powerful final chapter to this whole saga, isn't it? Yeah. The very conduct that was seemingly celebrated and rewarded internally, the ability to leverage strong connections, influence rates, secure hundreds of millions in profit, was retroactively redefined as illegal. And then dumbed squarely onto the shoulders of the person deemed most easily sacrificed.

SPEAKER_00: 27:16

Yeah. So if we try to connect this to the bigger picture, this case really forces a profound reevaluation of the entire LIBOR investigation narrative, doesn't it? The ultimate legal reversal by the UK Supreme Court confirms that the conduct UBS presented to regulators as evil and criminal was in fact potentially institutionalized and directed. The focus shifts decisively and maybe permanently from individual traitor misconduct to systematic corporate practice, and crucially, alleged corporate deception during the investigation.

SPEAKER_01: 27:48

It really raises a critical question, I think, about the dynamics between immense corporate power and regulatory compliance. When these massive corporate entities choose self-preservation through cooperation with regulators, and that cooperation demonstrably seems to require the deliberate fabrication of a narrative to pin blame on an individual, an individual who might have just been following internal policy. How often does the system end up rewarding corporate deception? And how do we truly measure the cost of that institutional betrayal on an individual's life? I mean, UBS effectively purchased corporate leniency with$1.5 billion in fines and five years of Tom Hayes' freedom.

SPEAKER_00: 28:22

Aaron Powell And what's just fascinating here, going back to the source material, is the claim that UBS's internal policy required traders to factor in profit when setting LIBOR rates. So if a global financial system, or at least a major player within it, mandates self-interest, if it defines standard practice as maximizing profit by submitting a rate at the high or low end of a supposedly acceptable range, where does the ethical line and the legal line between that standard practice and a conspiracy to defraud truly lie? And maybe more importantly, who is ultimately responsible for defining that line? Is it the bank, the regulators, the courts?

SPEAKER_01: 28:58

That's definitely something for you, our listeners, to mull over as this unprecedented$400 million lawsuit unfolds. A huge case to watch.